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Due Process And Security For Expense
Statutes: An Analysis Of California
Statutes In Light Of Recent Trends
In the past several years, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution and similar provisions of the
various state constitutions have been used with increasing frequency as
the bases for constitutional attacks upon summary prejudgment proce-
dures.1 In the first of these decisions, Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corporation,' the Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin prejudgment
wage garnishment statute. In arriving at the conclusion that the statute
contravened permissible standards of procedural due process, the Court
appeared to emphasize the fact that wages are a unique class of property
which presents distinct problems relating to summary procedures.3 Sub-
sequent litigants attempted to seize upon this language as a means of
limiting the Copurt's holding to wage garnishments; 4 however, the courts
were not receptive to such arguments. Thus, the Sniadach rationale has
been extended to various prejudgment procedures unrelated to the
special class of property with which the case dealt. These include
prejudgment attachments,5 claim and delivery statutes,6 appeal bonds
from municipal court judgments,7 proceedings relating to the revocation
of drivers' licenses,8 garagemen's liens,' distraint statutes,10 and other
summary procedures.1
1. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, (1975); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S.
56, (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
2. 395 U.S. 337 (1968).
3. Id. at 340.
4. See Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 547, 488 P.2d 13, 19, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 715 (1971).
5. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709
(1971); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
6. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486
P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
7. Brooks v. Small Claims Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249, 105 Cal. Rptr. 785
(1973).
8. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal. 3d 792, 499 P.2d
979, 103 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1973), vacated sub non. Dep't of Motor Vehicles of California
v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973), Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1973) (clarification on remand).
9. Adams v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 145 (1974).
10. Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
11. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
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The California courts have been in the forefront of the movement
toward judicial extensions of Sniadach.12 One of the recent areas to
which Sniadach has been held to be applicable is "security for expense"
statutes. 13 Already the California courts have invalidated two such
statutes,1 4 and there is some question concerning the continued validity
of the remaining security for expense statutes. The California security
for expense statutes as yet unchallenged on the Sniadach rationale in-
clude the following: (1) Code of Civil Procedure Section 1030 dealing
with suits brought by persons or corporations not residents of Califor-
nia; (2) Code of Civil Procedure Section 1029.5 dealing with suits
against architects and related professionals; (3) Code of Civil Proce-
dure Section 1029.6 dealing with suits against professionals in the health
fields; (4) Education Code Section 23175 dealing with suits against the
University of California's Board of Regents; (5) Corporations Code
Section 834 dealing with shareholders' derivative suits; (6) Code of
Civil Procedure Section 830 dealing with actions for libel and/or slan-
der; (7) Code of Civil Procedure Sections 391 through 391.6 dealing
with vexatious litigants; and (8) Military and Veterans Code Section
393 dealing with suits against persons in the active militia.
This comment will examine the recent cases to determine the due
process standards which will likely be applied to such statutes, and will
then analyze the statutes to ascertain whether they comply with these
standards. Further, where the present statutes are considered to be
constitutionally deficient, the comment will suggest means whereby the
statutes may be reformed to comply with the constitutional mandates of
the due process clause.
DuE PROCESS & SECURITY FOR EXPENSE STATUTES:
THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
As a prelude to an analysis of specific cases and statutes, it is
important to examine the general analytical framework characteristic of
12. See, e.g., Adams v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961,
113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974); Brooks v. Small Claims Ct., 8 Cal. 3d 661, 504 P.2d 1249,
105 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1973); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 42 (1971); McCalIop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1970).
13. The terms "security for expense" and "security for costs" are used interchange-
ably throughout this comment. The terms refer to a "security which a defendant in an
action may require of a plaintiff. . . for the payment of such costs as may be awarded
to the defendant." Black's Law Dictionary 416 (4th ed. rev. 1970).
14. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1975) (invalidating Government Code Sections 947 and 951 which impose a security
for expense requirement in actions against a public entity or public employee); Nork
v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973) (invalidating Code of
Civil Procedure Section 1029.6(e) which provides for security for costs in actions for
medical malpractice wherein the complaint seeks exemplary damages).
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cases considering the constitutionality of statutes attacked on the basis of
the due process clause. Primarily, courts have used a "definitional" or
"elemental" approach to issues of procedural due process.1" According
to this approach, the factors which must be present in order to raise a
due process attack are as follows: (a) state action;16 (b) a protected
liberty interest or property right;"7 and (c) a "taking.""8 If all three of
these elements are found, courts traditionally have balanced the interests
of the respective parties to ascertain whether, in view of the legislative
purpose and the relevant facts and circumstances, the particular proce-
dure being scrutinized affords sufficient procedural safeguards to the
respective parties.' 9
California's recent decisions dealing with security for expense statutes
have not departed from this analytical framework. 0 In 1973, Nork v.
Superior Court of Sacramento County2l squarely presented the Third
District Court of Appeals with the question of the constitutionality of
Code of Civil Procedure Section 1029.6 (e), which deals with dam-
ages actions against various professionals in health-related fields2
wherein exemplary damages are sought. The statute expressly provides
15 , The terms "definitional" and "elemental" are used here to describe the reason-ing process whereby a court sets forth the legal requisites for application of a legal con-cept, herein that of procedural due process, and then attempts to determine whether allof the legal requisites are found in the particular case. See generally Goss V. Lopez,419 U.S. 565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bd. of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV expressly limits the amendment's application to "state
action," for it provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges orimmunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive anyperson of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to anyperson within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (Emphasis
added.)
State action sufficient to raise the fourteenth amendment has been found where statefinancial aid was given to private institutions; see, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.564 (1972); where private conduct is clothed with the appearance of state participation;see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); where the co-ercive powers of the state are involved in private conduct; see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer,334 U.S. 1 (1948); where the state encourages or authorizes private conduct which vi-olates liberty or property rights; see, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); andwhere private institutions perform an integral part of a governmental scheme; see, e.g.,Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,376 U.S. 938 (1964).
17. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164 (1974) (Powell and Blackmun,JJ., concurring); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).18. See, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550, 488 P.2d 13, 21-22, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 717-18 (1971).
19. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 570; Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.at 167-68 (Powell and Blackmun, JJ., concurring),,
20. See cases cited in note 12 supra.
21. 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973).22. CAL. CODE CIV. Pnoc. Section 1029.6 includes the following professionalswithin its coverage: physician and surgeon, dentist, registered nurse, dispensing optician,optometrist, pharmacist, registered physical therapist, podiatrist, licensed psychologist,osteopath, chiropractor, clinical laboratory bioanalyst, clinical laboratory technologist, orveterinarian, duly licensed such under the laws of this state or a licensed hospital asthe employer of any such person ....
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that the defendant in such actions may obtain an ex parte order that
the plaintiff post bond to indemnify the defendant for costs and
reasonable attorney's fees for defending against the claim for exemplary
damages where the plaintiff fails to recover on the cause of action for
exemplary damages.23 Failure to provide sufficient bond is grounds for
dismissal of the claim for exemplary damages.24 The court invalidated
the statute on due process grounds, basing its opinion primarily on the
fact that "[n]o hearing of any kind is required [under the statute] since
the proceeding is ex parte. '' 25 In arriving at this conclusion, the court
indicated that the taking of property was present because, if a bond was
filed, the plaintiff was deprived of the premium paid for the bond, while
if cash was deposited in lieu of a bond, the plaintiff would be deprived
of the use of the money deposited pending the outcome of the litiga-
tion."0 The court further acknowledged the legislative interest in protect-
ing both medical practitioners and society from the potentially detrimen-
tal effects of frivolous claims for punitive damages, but found this
purpose lacking in the exigencies necessary to justify the degree of
denial of procedural safeguards called for under the statute.2r
More recently, the California Supreme Court, in Beaudreau v. Superi-
or Court of Los Angeles County,28 invalidated the security for expense
provisions of Government Code Sections 947 and 951 which deal with
damages actions against public entities and public employees in their
official capacities, respectively.2 9 The Beaudreau court reasoned that the
23. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6(e).
24. CAL. CoDE Cxv. PROC. §1029.6(e) provides:
Whenever a complaint described in subdivision (a) requests an award of ex-
emplary damages, any defendant against whom the damages are sought may
move the court for an ex parte order requiring the plaintiff to file a corporate
surety bond, approved by the court, or make a cash deposit in an amount fixed
by the court. Upon the filing of the motion, the court shall require the plain-
tiff to file the bond or make the cash deposit. In no event shall the bond or
cash deposit be less than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500). The
bond or cash deposit shall be conditioned upon payment by the plaintiff of all
costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the defendant in defending
against the request for the award of exemplary damages, as determined by the
court, if the plaintiff fails to recover any exemplary damages. The order re-
quiring the bond or cash deposit shall require the bond to be filed or cash de-
posit to be made with the clerk of the court not later than 30 days after the
order is served. If the bond is not filed or the cash deposit is not made within
such period, upon the motion of the defendant, the court shall strike the por-
tion of the complaint which requests the award of exemplary damages.
25. Nork v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 1001, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428, 430 (1973).
26. Id., 33 Cal. App. 3d at 1001-1002, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 431-32.
27. Id., 33 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 430. (The court also dis-
cussed, inter alia, the "taking" issue, but assumed sub silento the presence of state action
sufficient to raise the fourteenth amendment.)
28. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE §951 provides:
At any time after the filing of the complaint in an action against a public em-
ployee or former public employee, if a public entity undertakes to provide for
the defense of the action, the attorney for the public employee may file and
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statutes in question operate to cause a "taking" in at least two ways.
First, whether the plaintiff complies with the security requirement by
either posting a bond or paying the equivalent sum of money into court,
he suffers a "taking," for in the former case he is at least deprived of the
use of the premium paid to acquire the bond, while in the latter case he
is deprived of the use of the entire amount of money deposited with the
court.30 Second, a taking results when the plaintiff's meritorious claim is
dismissed for failure to provide a sufficient bond.s"
With respect to the requisite of a liberty or property right, 2 the court
found that there were two property rights affected by the statutes. The
premium on the bond3 3and/or the money deposited into court in lieu of
filing a bond34 constitute property rights within the ambit of the four-
teenth amendment.35 Further, the court found that a "claim against a
public entity or public employee, assuming it is bona fide and potentially
meritorious, is a 'property interest' within the meaning of the due
process clause."'36
In balancing the interests of the respective parties,3 the court deter-
mined that the legislative purpose behind the statutes was twofold: first,
to discourage the filing of nonmeritorious suits without imposing an
serve a demand for a written undertaking on the part of each plaintiff as se-
curity for the allowable costs which may be awarded against such plaintiff.
The undertaking shall be in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100), or such
greater sum as the court shall fix upon good cause shown, with at least two
sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court. Unless the plaintiff files such
undertaking within 20 days after service of the demand therefor, his action
shall be dismissed.
CAL. GOV'T CODE §947 provides:
At any time after the filing of the complaint in any action against a public
entity, the public entity may file and serve a demand for a written undertaking
on the part of each plaintiff as security for the allowable costs which may be
awarded against such plaintiff. The undertaking shall be in the amount of one
hundred dollars ($100) for each plaintiff or in the case of multiple plaintiffs
in the amount of two hundred dollars ($200), or such greater sum as the court
shall fix upon good cause shown, with at least two sufficient sureties, to be
approved by the court. Unless the plaintiff files such undertaking within 20
days after service of a demand therefor, his action shall be dismissed.
30. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 456, 535 P.2d 713, 717, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585, 589 (1975).
31. Id. 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
32. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
33. Beaudreau v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 3d at 455, 535 P.2d 717, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 589, citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5
Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clam Valley,
1 Cal. 3d 908, 464 P.2d 125, 83 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1970); McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal.
3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666 (1970).
34. See note 28 supra.
35. Other recognized property rights include public education (Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975)), welfare benefits (Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)), a drivers'
license (Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)), and tenured public employment (Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
36. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 456-57, 535 P.2d 713, 718, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 590 (1975), citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
37. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
1976 / Due Process and Security for Expense Statutes
unreasonable burden on the filing of meritorious suits,38 and second, to
protect the defendant from the expense of defending against unmerito-
rious suits. 9 The court then considered the procedural safeguards prof-
fered by the statutes in question, which provide for a mandatory dismis-
sal of the cause of action if the plaintiff fails to provide the demanded
security.4" Finding that all of this took place without any judicial
determination of the merit of the claim asserted by the plaintiff, the
court concluded that the summary procedures provided for in the stat-
utes were not sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet the legislative pur-
pose behind their enactment, and thus held the statutes invalid. 1 In
coming to this conclusion, the court considered several of the statutes'
characteristics. The statutes made no provision for a hearing on the issue
of whether the statutory purpose behind the security requirement would
be served by imposing such a requirement in the particular case.42 The
trial court had no discretion concerning whether to dismiss the action if
the plaintiff failed to provide the required security.4" The statute provid-
ed no standards for determining the reasonableness of the amount of the
bond demanded from the plaintiff,44 nor did it define what was "good
cause" for demanding that security be posted in an amount greater than
that provided for by statute.45 Thus, according to the court, the proce-
dure "exclude[d] consideration of . . . element[s] essential to the
decision '' 46 and thereby denie[d] the plaintiff a meaningful hearing
"appropriate to the nature of the case."' 47 This, the court concluded,
failed to meet the standards of procedural due process.
CALIFORNIA STATUTES AS YET UNCHALLENGED
From the foregoing analysis it should be obvious that a security for
expense requirement constitutes a taking of a property right within the
purview of the state and federal constitutional protections. The Beau-
dreau court's analysis is instructive insofar as it points out some of the
38. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 453, 535 P.2d 713, 715, 121 Cal. Rptr.
585, 587 (1975).
39. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 457, 535 P.2d at 718, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 590.
40. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 588.
41. See Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 460, 535 P.2d at 720-21, 121 Cal.
Rptr. at 592-93; see also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1968).





46. Id., quoting Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
47. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct, 14 Cal. 3d 448, 460, 535 P.2d 713, 720-21, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 592-93 (1975), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1964) and
Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Company, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
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characteristics upon which it based its determination that the statutes
before it were unconstitutional. 8 It remains to be determined, however,
precisely what procedural safeguards are required in the various other
actions wherein security for expenses is required by statute in California.
A. Shareholder's Derivative Suits
When a person brings a derivative sui 9 on behalf of a corporation,
the California Corporations Code provides a comparatively elaborate
procedure for security for costs.5 0 Briefly, the code provides that the
defendant corporation or corporate director may move the court for an
order requiring the furnishing of security. 51 Such a motion may be had
only upon notice and hearing, and must be based on the grounds that
either there is no reasonable possibility that the action will benefit the
corporation or its security holders, or that the defendant did not partici-
48. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 460, 535 P.2d at 720-21, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 592-93. (Key considerations include the fact that the statute makes no provision for
a hearing upon notice to the plaintiff, nor does the court have discretion to deny the
security request. Further, there is no standard for determining the reasonable value of
the services secured, or the necessity of security in the particular case.)
49. O'Hare v. Marine Elec. Co., 229 Cal. App. 2d 33, 39 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1964)
indicates that a derivative suit is one based on injury to the corporation or to its stock-
holders collectively as opposed to an injury directly to an individual shareholder.
50. CAL. CORP. CODE §834 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
the corporation or any defendant who is an officer or director of the corpora-
tion, or held such office at the time of the acts complained of, the corporation
or such defendant may move the court for an order, upon notice and hearing,
requiring the plaintiff to furnish security as hereinafter provided. Such motion
shall be based upon one or more of the following grounds:
(1) That there is no reasonable possibility that the prosecution of the cause
of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party will benefit the
corporation or its security holders;
(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate
in the transaction complained of in any capacity.
At the hearing upon such motion, the court shall consider such evidence...
as may be material: (a) to the ground or grounds upon which the motion is
based, or (b) to a determination of the probable reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, of the corporation and the moving party which will be incurred
in the defense of the action. If the court determines, after hearing the evi-
dence adduced by the parties at the hearing, that the moving party has estab-
lished a probability in support of any of the grounds upon which the motion
is based, the court shall fix the nature and amount of security, not to exceed
twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) .. . . The corporation and the mov-
ing party shall have recourse to such security in such amount as the court shall
determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such security
may. . . be increased or decreased in the discretion of the court upon showing
that the security provided has or may become inadequate or excessive ....
If the court upon any such motion makes a determination that security shall
be furnished by the plaintiff as to any one or more defendants, the action shall
be dismissed as to such defendant or defendants, unless the security required
by the court shall have been furnished within such reasonable time as may be
fixed by the court.
The California legislature recently enacted a substantial revision of the current Corpora-
tions Code. Included within those revisions is a section dealing with security for costs
in shareholders' derivative suits, however the statutory procedure provided in the new
statute makes no significant change in the current law. See CAL. CORP. CODE §800,
enacted CAL. STATS. 1975-76, c. 682 §7 at - (effective Jan. 1, 1977).
51. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
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pate in the transaction complained of in any capacity. -5 2 The requisite
hearing must include all evidence material to a determination of the
grounds for the motion, and the reasonable expenses which will be
incurred by the defendant in defending against the action.53 If the court
determines, as a result of this hearing, that the defendant has established
the probable validity of the grounds for the motion, it may then require
the plaintiff to post a bond up to $25,000 to secure to the defendant
such costs as may be awarded by the court upon termination of the
action.54 Failure to provide the ordered security within such reasonable
time as determined by the court may yield mandatory dismissal of the
action against the defendant(s) requesting the posting of security.55
Pending the court's decision on the motion for security, the prosecution
of the action is suspended. 6
The purpose behind this security for expense requirement is not
merely to create a fund from which the court awarded fees and costs
may be recovered, but also to lessen the potential for multiple suits and
provide for an orderly procedure for derivative litigation. Considering
these statutory procedures in light of this legislative purpose, it is a near
certainty that a due process attack would be unsuccessful. 58 Even the
most careful scrutiny of the statute reveals none of the procedural
inadequacies upon which courts have relied in finding a denial of
procedural due process. The statute narrowly limits the security require-
ment to situations where there is no reasonable possibility that the
litigation will be beneficial to the moving party.59 Further, no security
52. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
53. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
54. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
55. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b).
56 . CAL. CORP. CODE §834(c).
57. See Freeman v. Goldberg, 55 Cal. 2d 622, 625, 361 P.2d 244, 245, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 669, (1961); Bailey v. Fosca Oil Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 813, 31 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1963).
58. For an earlier case rejecting a due process attack on CAL. CORP. CODE §834,
see Beyerbach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 Cal. 2d 11, 265 P.2d 1, appeal dismissed 347 U.S.
985 (1954).
The Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Benef. Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) re-
jected a due process attack on a New Jersey statute which provided that, at any time
prior to judgment, the defendant in a shareholders' derivative suit may require the plain-
tiff to post bond to indemnify the defendant for his reasonable costs. The statute to
which Cohen addressed itself made no provision for a hearing of any kind on the ques-
tion of the propriety of imposing an undertaking requirement in the particular case, nor
did it provide for a hearing on the question of the reasonableness of the amount of bond
demanded by the defendant. The Cohen holding is entirely inconsistent with the recent
trend in this area, and it is therefore submitted that Cohen would be decided differently
modernly.
59. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b); see, e.g., Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d
536, 541, 488 P.2d 13, 15, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 711 (1971) (statute must be narrowly
tailored to serve the asserted legislative purpose); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corpora-
tion, 395 U.S. 337, 342-43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (necessity of inquiry into
probable validity of claim); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971) (necessity of in-
quiry into probable validity of claim).
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can be required except on prior notice and hearing to the plaintiff,0 and
at the hearing the court must consider all evidence material to the
question of the propriety of a security deposit and the reasonableness of
the amount requested."1 This is clearly the type of procedure which
would be considered "meaningful" and "appropriate to the nature of the
case," 2 and therefore in keeping with the requirements of procedural
due process.
B. Libel or Slander
As a condition precedent to the issuance of a summons in an action
for libel or slander, California Code of Civil Procedure Section 830
requires the plaintiff to file a bond in the amount of $500 to secure to
the defendant the costs and charges which may be awarded against the
plaintiff."3 The statute further provides for a mandatory dismissal of the
action if it is brought without filing the required bond.
4
In addition to the obvious purpose of securing to the defendant the
costs which may be awarded to him by the court," the statute has been
held to serve other significant purposes. Shell Oil Company v. Superior
Court" indicates that the bond requirement is "to protect those who in
good faith are exercising their constitutional guaranties of free speech
and freedom of the press against the too common practice of instituting
libel and slander suits inspired by mere spite or ill-will and without
good faith.""7 This was further clarified in Brandt v. Superior Court"8
wherein the court stated that
[the need to post an undertaking impresses upon a party who
feels aggrieved the gravity of litigation, tends to engender mature
consideration of the propriety of going forward with a lawsuit, and
thereby, indirectly, gives some protection to those exercising their
right to express opinions.69
60. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b). Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 485,
87 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (1970) (regarding general due process requirement of prior notice
and hearing); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79 (1972) (regarding general due process
requirement of prior notice and hearing).
61. CAL. CORP. CODE §834(b); Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 462, 535
P.2d 713, 722. 121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 594 (1975).
62. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct. 14 Cal. 3d at 460, 535 P.2d at 721, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 593; see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971).
63. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §830.
64. CAL. CODE CIv. PROc. §830.
65. See Bried v. Super. CL, 11 Cal. 2d 351, 354, 79 P.2d 1091, 1093 (1938);
Brandt v. Super. Ct., 67 Cal. 2d 437, 441, 432 P.2d 31, 34, 62 Cal. Rptr. 429, 432
(1967).
66. 2 Cal. App. 2d 348, 37 P.2d 1078 (1934).
67. Id. at 355, 37 P.2d at 1081.
68. 67 Cal. 2d 437, 432 P.2d 31, 62 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1967).
69. Brandt v. Super. Ct., 67 Cal. 2d 437, 441, 432 P.2d 31, 34, 62 Cal. Rptr. 429,
432 (1967).
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Even with such a laudatory legislative purpose, however, it is still at
best doubtful whether this statute provides sufficient safeguards to be
constitutional under the Sniadach line of cases. This is because the
statutory procedure contains nearly every characteristic of which this
line of cases disapproves.
The most obvious deficiency in the statutory procedure is that it
makes no provision for any form of notice or hearing. 70 It is elementary
to current due process thinking that where there is a taking of property
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment, procedural due process
at the very least requires some form of prior notice and a hearing
appropriate to the nature of the particular case.
71
Nork v. Superior Court72 presented the same problem with respect to
a statute's failure to provide for any form of notice prior to imposition of
a security for costs requirement, but in the context of punitive damages
in medical malpractice suits.7 13 Holding the statute invalid, the Nork
court summarized its provisions as follows:
the order is made ex parte, no showing of merit or lack thereof is
required, an arbitrary minimum bond or cash deposit . . . is re-
quired,. . . and no proof is required as to the probable costs or at-
torney's fees likely to be incurred by the defendant seeking the
bond. If such a bond so fixed is not posted. . . the cause of ac-
tion. . . must be dismissed.7
4
This characterization could be applied almost verbatim to Code of Civil
Procedure Section 830. That section makes no provision for any judicial
participation whatsoever in the bond procedure, for it is the clerk who
requires the filing of a bond as a condition precedent to the issuance of a
summons. 5 Considerations relating to the merits of the underlying
defamation action, to the necessity or propriety of the bond in the
particular circumstances and to its reasonable amount are conspicuous-
ly absent from the statute.
Such a total absence of procedural safeguards can only be condoned
70. Both the Beaudreau and Nork cases, for example, indicate the significance of
the absence of any form of notice or hearing prior to the taking of a protected property
interest. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 458, 535 P.2d at 719, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 591; Nork v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973).
71. See generally Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337 (1968);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1970).
72. Nork v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973).
73. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §1029.6.
74. Nork v. Super. Ct., 37 Cal. App. 3d at 1000, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 431 (Note that
the minimum bond requirement imposed pursuant to CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §1029.6 is
$2,500, while CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §830 requires a $500 bond).
75. After Sniadach it can no longer be doubted that the clerk does not function
as a judicial officer for due process purposes, for it is this very type of participation
that was invalidated in Sniadach. 395 U.S. 337, 338 (1968).
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under exceptional circumstances.' 6 Circumstances under which courts
have condoned this degree of infringement upon interests protected by
the due process clause have related to internal revenue service debts,
national war, economic disaster or bank collapse and contaminated or
misbranded food or drugs.17 Clearly no such "public necessity" 78 exists
with respect to actions for defamation. Nor is Code of Civil Procedure
Section 830 "narrowly tailored" 79 to serve the asserted legislative pur-
pose. Since the statute requires an undertaking of all plaintiffs, it fails to
distinguish between cases where the statutory purpose is served by
imposing the security requirement, and where it is not served. For
example, libel may be actionable on its face, or it may be actionable only
upon proof of special damages.80 By making no inquiry into the proprie-
ty of imposing the security requirement in a particular case, the statute
may operate to deprive a plaintiff of an unquestionably valid cause of
action merely because of the failure to provide a bond, while at the same
time permitting the filing of a clearly invalid cause of action merely
because the particular plaintiff posts bond as requested.81 For these
reasons as well as others discussed above,8" Code of Civil Procedure
Section 830 should be held invalid when properly challenged on the
basis of procedural due process.
This statute could easily be rehabilitated to comport with the require-
ments of procedural due process. Using Corporations Code Section 834
as a model, the statute could be rewritten to provide for a hearing upon
notice to the parties, said hearing to address itself to the question of
whether there is any reasonable possibility of the plaintiff recovering
judgment in his favor. If no such reasonable possibility of recovery exists
then the court should hear all evidence relevant to a determination of the
reasonable expenses which may be incurred by the defendant in defend-
ing the suit. The court should then order the filing of a bond in that
reasonable amount, subject to the caveat that failure to provide the bond
is grounds for dismissal of the action. The adversary hearing provided
76. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343 (1968) (Harlan, J., con-
curring).
77. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91-92 (1972) (citations omitted).
78. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 550-51, 488 P.2d 13, 22, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 709, 718-19 (1971), citing Mendoza v. Small Claims Ct., 49 Cal. 2d 668, 672,
321 P.2d 9, 12 (1958).
79. See generally Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. at 339.
80. See generally 3 Wrri.N, SuMMARY oF CALt oNu LAw, Torts §§276-92 (8th
ed. 1974).
81. Although the hypothetical posed here is unlikely, it serves to point to the neces-
sity for some logical nexus between the goals sought to be achieved by a statute and
the statutory vehicle designed to accomplish these goals.
82. See text accompanying notes 53-63 supra. It should be noted that one appellate
court, upon consideration of the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure Section 830
in light of Beaudreau, has held the statute unconstitutional as a deprivation of due proc-
ess and equal protection. Allen v. Jordanos' Inc., 52 Cal. App. 3d 160, - Cal. Rptr.
-(1975).
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by this suggested procedure would serve the legislative purpose of
protecting the good faith exercise of the constitutional freedoms of
speech and press against defamation suits "inspired by mere spite or ill-
will and without good faith,""3 for it is only reasonable to assume that
such suits will not be filed where the court has already determined that
there is no reasonable possibility of judgment for the plaintiff. Where
such a case is pursued after a judicial determination that it appears to
lack merit, the defendant's rights are protected by securing to him the
costs of defending the nonmeritorious action. The plaintiff's right to
vindication of his good name is also protected by this suggested proce-
dure, since the security requirement will not be imposed where the
plaintiff has a meritorious cause of action.
C. Nonresident Plaintiffs & Foreign Corporations
By the terms of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1030, a defendant in
a suit brought by a nonresident plaintiff or foreign corporation84 may
require the plaintiff to post bond in an amount not to exceed $300.85 A
new or additional bond may be obtained only by court order upon proof
of the insufficiency of the original bond.86 The proceedings are suspend-
ed until the required bond is filed.87 If the bond is not filed within 30
days from service of notice upon the plaintiff, the court may dismiss the
case.
88
The cases which have interpreted and applied this section indicate
that the defendant in a suit brought by a nonresident plaintiff has an
almost absolute right to have the plaintiff post bond prior to continuing
with the proceedings, and that this right is not subject to infringement
even by the courts.89 The nondiscretionary nature of the imposition of a
bond requirement under this statute is further indicated by the legisla-
tive provision for a mandatory stay of the proceedings until the bond is
filed, which impliedly indicates that the court may be acting beyond its
powers if it proceeds with the case without the bond requested by the
defendant.90
Particularly important to the due process analysis are the judicial
83. Shell Oil Co., v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. App. 2d 348, 355, 37 P.2d 1078, 1081
(1934).
84. Hereinafter, all references in this section to "nonresident plaintiff" or to
"plaintiff" are intended to include foreign corporations.
85. CAL. CODE Civ. Ploc. §1030.
86. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1030.
87. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1030.
88. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §1030.
89. Carter v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. 752, 757, 169 P. 667, 669 (1917); Clune v. Sulli-
van, 56 Cal. 249, 251 (1880); Gadette v. Recorder's Ct. of East San Diego, 53 Cal.
App. 72, 73, 199 P. 817, 818 (1921); Mead County Bank v. Bailey, 137 Cal. 447, 448,
70 P. 297 (1902).
90. Gadette v. Recorders Ct. of East San Diego, 53 Cal. App. 72, 74, 199 P. 817,
818 (1921).
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interpretations of the last sentence of Code of Civil Procedure Section
1030 which address the court's power to dismiss the case for failure to
comply with the bond requirement. Although the language of the statute
is cast in permissive as opposed to mandatory terms,9' the courts have
not interpreted it so. This permissive language has been read as indicat-
ing merely that the court must dismiss the action if the bond is not filed
within 30 days from the demand unless the failure to file the bond is
excused. 2 The court's discretion here extends only to allowing the filing
of a late bond, not to proceeding with the case without a bondY3
Therefore, the statute, as interpreted, effectively imposes upon the plain-
tiff a security for expense requirement without judicial participation in
any form and without giving the court any discretion to waive the
requirement except in proceedings in forma pauperis.
94
The legislative purpose or justification for this near total absence of
procedural safeguards is "the probable difficulty or impracticability of
enforcing judicial mandates against persons not dwelling within the
jurisdiction of the courts." ' Assuming arguendo the propriety and
wisdom of this legislative premise which prompted the statutory enact-
ment, it is still necessary to determine whether there exist sufficient
exigent circumstances to justify the degree of denial of procedural
safeguards cafled for pursuant to the statute.96 It should be noted
preliminarily that the burden upon the court and the defendant in
permitting the plaintiff a hearing on the issue of the necessity and/or
propriety of imposing the undertaking requirement in a particular case
is nominal when one considers that both the plaintiff and the defendant
are already subject to the court's jurisdiction at the time a security
requirement is imposed. In addition, the burden upon the plaintiff by
virtue of a deprivation of a protected property interest without any
procedural safeguards may be significant.97 Furthermore, individual
security for litigation expenses is not the type of public necessity which
the courts have recognized as sufficient to justify such extreme depar-
91. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1030 provides, in part, that
[a]fter the lapse of 30 days from the service of notice that security is required,
or of an order for new or additional security, upon proof thereof, and that no
undertaking as required has been filed, the court or judge may order the action
or special proceeding to be dismissed.
(Emphasis added.)
92j. Carter v. Super. Ct., 176 Cal. 752, 755, 169 P. 667, 668 (1917); see also Hertz
v. Super. Ct., 35 Cal. App. 83, 169 P. 258 (1917).
93. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Horn, 85 Cal. App. 2d, 339, 193 P.2d 42 (1948).
94. Roberts v. Super. CL, 264 Cal. App. 2d 235, 239-41, 70 Cal. Rptr. 226, 229-
30 (1968); Bank of America v. Super. Ct., 255 Cal. App. 2d 575, 577-78, 63 Cal. Rptr.
366, 367-68 (1967).
95. Myers v. Carter, 178 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625-26, 3 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207-08
(1960), quoting Morek v. Smolak, 282 N.Y.S. 418, 419 (1935).
96. See, e.g., Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 460-61, 535 P.2d 713, 721,
121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 593 (1975).
97. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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tures from the procedural requisites of the due process clause.98
The use of summary procedures by residents against nonresidents
was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Ownbey v.
Morgan,99 wherein the court rejected a constitutional attack on a statute
which provided for prejudgment attachment of a nonresident's local
assets by a resident creditor. There is significant dicta in Randone v.
Appellate Department,10 however, that Ownbey was decided on the
basis of
notions of jurisdictional authority controlling at the time of the...
decision, [which] frequently provided [for prejudgment attach-
ment as] the only basis by which a state could afford its citizens
an effective remedy for injuries inflicted by nonresidents. 101
This dictum indicates that with the currently expanded notions of state
jurisdiction, the exigencies justifying the Ownbey decision may no long-
er exist, and therefore the case might be decided differently today. If this
is the case, it logically follows that Code of Civil Procedure Section 1030
could also be held invalid modernly.
As with the statute discussed previously, it is suggested that Corpora-
tions Code Section 834 serve as a model for rehabilitating Section 1030
of the Code of Civil Procedure to comport with the requirements of
procedural due process. 0 2 A judicial inquiry into the question of the
existence of a reasonable possibility of the plaintiff recovering judgment,
and the interposition of a security requirement only where no such
possibility exists, would clearly satisfy the requirements of procedural
due process. In fact, insofar as the legislative purpose is to guard against
the potential nonenforceability of the state's judicial decrees, 0 3 it is
highly possible that a standard more stringent than that of "reasonable
possibility" might be constitutionally imposed upon a nonresident plain-
tiff in order to excuse the necessity of filing a bond to secure the
defendant his costs.
0 4
D. Members of the Active Militia and the Regents
of the University of California
Education Code Section 23175, which deals with suits against the
98. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
99. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
100. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 448 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
101. 5 Cal. 3d at 554, 448 P.2d at 24, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
102. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra for a discussion of CAL. CoRP. CODn
§834.
103. See note 73 supra.
104. See, e.g., McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 905, 464 P.2d 122, 124, 83
Cal. Rptr. 666, 668 (1970); see also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337,
343 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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University of California, and Military and Veterans Code Section 393,
which deals with suits against persons for wrongs committed in their
official capacities with the active militia, contain substantially similar
provisions, and are therefore analyzed together.
Pursuant to the provisions of Education Code Section 23175, in any
suit against the Regents of the University of California, the regents may
demand that the plaintiff file a bond to secure to the defendant re-
gent(s) the allowable costs incurred in defending the suit.105 The statute
fixes the bond at $100 if there is a single plaintiff, and $200 in the event
there are multiple plaintiffs.0 6 The court may fix bond in a greater sum
upon a showing of good cause by the defendant.10 7 If the plaintiff fails
to file the demanded bond within 20 days after service of the demand,
the statute provides that the action shall be dismissed.'0
Section 393 of the Military and Veterans Code utilizes a similar
procedure. This section provides that when suit is brought
against an active member of the militia or a member of the militia
in active service ... for an act [or omission to act] done by such
member in his official capacity in the discharge of duty . . . the
defendant may require the person instituting or prosecuting the ac-
tion. . . to file security in an amount not less than one hundred
dollars ($100), to be fixed by the court, for the payment of costs
that may be awarded to the defendant therein.' 09
The statute further provides that, depending upon whether the suit is
civil or criminal, the Attorney General or a judge advocate shall defend
the defendant in the suit.1 0
Inasmuch as there are no reported cases construing or interpreting
these sections and nothing instructive in the published legislative history,
the legislative purpose behind their enactment remains obscure. Among
the several possible purposes which may have prompted the legislature
to enact these sections are the following: (1) to discourage the filing of
frivolous suits against persons engaged in the performance of their
official duties, and (2) to indemnify the defendant for the litigation
costs incurred by him by virtue of his official position.
With respect to discouraging frivolous suits, the analysis in Beaudreau
v. Superior Court"' is directly on point. In analyzing the statutes before
105. CAL. EDuc. CODE §23175.
106. CAL. EDUC. CODE §23175.
107. CAL. EDuc. CODE §23175.
108. CAL. EDuc. CODE §23175.
109. CAL. MIL. & VErs. CODE §393.
110. CAL. Mi.. & Vms. CODE §393.
111. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 535 P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
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it" 2 the Beaudreau court found that
the procedure prescribed by these statutes to effectuate such pur-
pose does not distinguish between the classes of plaintiffs on the
basis of the merit of -the actions brought by them. ... [The] de-
fendants are given the absolute right to demand an undertaking for
costs as specified by the. . sections.
If a defendant limits his demand to the amount automatically al-
lowable by statute . . . .no prior or subsequent judicial approval
is required .. .. [Ulpon application of the defendant (appar-
ently ex parte) and upon "good cause shown," the court may fix
undertakings in greater amounts113
The statutes make no provision for inquiry into the merit of the
plaintiff's claim or of the need for an undertaking and its reasonable
sum, and "the court has no discretion to dispense with the undertaking
requirement.""' 4 Under the Beaudreau analysis, insofar as
-these statutes are purportedly designed to protect ... against the
cost of defending frivolous law suits, a due process hearing would
necessarily inquire into the merit of the plaintiff's action as well as
into the reasonableness of the amount of -the undertaking in light
of the defendant's probable expenses." 5
Another case, Bell v. Burson,"" suggests the due process ramifica-
tions of the second legislative purpose mentioned above, namely that of
indemnifying the defendant for litigation costs incurred by him by virtue
of his official position." 7 Although dissimilar on its facts, 118 Bell may
be said to stand for the general proposition that wherever a deposit
requirement is imposed, due process requires a hearing to determine
both the reasonable possibility of success in the underlying action,
and the reasonableness of the amount of the deposit in light of the
depositor's potential liability."' Inasmuch as neither Military and Veter-
ans Code Section 393 nor Education Code Section 23175 provides for
112. Beaudreau dealt with CAL. Gov'T CODE §§947 and 951; 14 Cal. 3d 448, 53
P.2d 713, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
113. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 453-54, 535 P.2d at 716, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 588.
114. Id. at 454, 535 P.2d at 715, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
115. Beaudreau v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d at 460, 535 P.2d at 720, 121 Cal. Rptr.
at 592. Also note that CAL. MIn. & VETS. CODE §393 provides that the defendant is
defended by the Attorney General or judge advocate, thereby substantially reducing the
defendant's litigation costs.
116. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
117. See text preceding note 81 supra.
118. Bell v. Burson involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a state statute
which provided that when an uninsured motorist was involved in an automobile accident,
he was required to either deposit a statutorily fixed sum of money or suffer the suspen-
sion of his drivers license. The Court held that the statute failed to comply with the
procedural requirements of the due process clause. See text accompanying note 119
infra.
119. Bell v. Burson. 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
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any inquiry into the reasonableness of the amount of deposit required in
the particular case or the reasonable possibility of success in the underly-
ing action, it is submitted that both sections fail to conform to the
requirements of procedural due process.
As indicated in Bell v. Burson2 ° and Beaudreau v. Superior Court,
12 1
a statutory procedure providing for judicial inquiry into the questions of
(1) whether, in the particular case, the statutory purpose would be
promoted by interposing an undertaking requirement, and (2) the
reasonableness of the amount of such an undertaking, would undoubt-
edly satisfy the mandates of procedural due process. Such a procedure
would protect the plaintiffs interests by not imposing an undertaking
requirement unnecessarily, while at the same time promoting the de-
fendant's interests by imposing such a requirement where the circum-
stances warrant its imposition.
E. Architects and Physicians
The following analysis addresses itself to the constitutionality of Code
of Civil Procedure Sections 1029.5 and 1029.6. Although the profes-
sional fields dealt with in these statutes are unrelated, 122 the statutory
procedures with respect to each are nearly identical. Where these stat-
utes do differ, such differences will be pointed out in the discussion.
These statutes provide that in a suit against an architect or physician,
the defendant may, within a limited time after service of process' and
upon notice and hearing to the plaintiff, 24 move the court for an order
requiring the plaintiff to file a bond to secure to the defendant the costs
which may be awarded against the plaintiff. 25  Such motion for a
security bond must be accompanied by an affidavit indicating that the
plaintiff's claim is frivolous.' 28 In order to obtain a bond, the defendant
must show
to the satisfaction of the court that (i) the plaintiff would not suffer
undue economic hardship in filing such written undertaking, and
(ii) there is no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff has a cause
120. Id.
121. 14 Cal. 3d 448, 460, 535 P.2d 713, 720, 121 Cal. Rptr. 585, 594 (1975).
122. CAL. CoDE Crv. PROC. §1029.5 deals with architects, engineers, building design-
ers or land surveyors licensed under California law; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.6 deals
with the fields listed in note 22 supra.
123. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.5 provides that the bond request must be filed
within 30 days from the service of process; CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §1029.6 provides that
such a request must be made within 6 months from service of process.
124. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§1029.5 and 1029.6.
125. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.5(c) provides for a bond in the sum of $500 per
defendant, up to a $3,000 maximum; CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. §1029.6(c) provides for a
bond not to exceed $500 per defendant, up to a maximum of $1,000.
126. CAL. CODE CMr. PROC. §§1029.5(a) and 1029.6(a).
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of action against each named defendant with respect to whom the
plaintiff would otherwise be required to file such written under-
taking.12
7
Failure to provide the bond within such reasonable time as is set by the
court is grounds for dismissal of the action. 1 2
The legislative purpose behind these statutes is undoubtedly to dis-
courage the filing of frivolous suits, and to secure the defendant's
recovery of his costs in such suits. The statutes are carefully worded to
permit the imposition of a security requirement only where there is no
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff has a valid cause of action.'29
Thus they are narrowly tailored to serve their intended purpose. The
statutes provide for notice to all parties and a hearing before a judge,
with the judicial inquiry limited to the only questions relevant to the
security requirement, i.e. the existence of a reasonable possibility of the
plaintiff's success in the action, and whether the security requirement
would be unduly burdensome on the particular plaintiff. °30 These statu-
tory safeguards clearly fall within the permissible range of procedures
contemplated by procedural due process. In fact, the language of these
statutes is nearly identical to that used in many of the more recent due
process cases in suggesting how statutes could be written to conform to
the requirements of procedural due process.'' It is therefore submitted
that these statutes would withstand a constitutional attack based on the
due process clause of the state and federal constitutions.
F. Vexatious Litigants
California's Vexatious Litigant Statute 32 provides that a defendant
may move the court, upon notice and hearing, for an order that the
plaintiff, a vexatious litigant, post security for the defendant's reasonable
litigation costs which may be awarded at the termination of the litiga-
tion. 3 3 Such a motion must be made within 30 days from service of
127. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §1029.5(a) provides that the court's determination on
the question of whether or not to impose a bond is not appealable, while CAL. CODE
Civ. PRoc. §1029.6 has no such provision. The former section, as written, raises a sub-
stantial due process question. It is probable that if the section is challenged, it will be
construed as permitting review on the basis of substantial evidence and abuse of discre-
tion, and thus held constitutional in that respect.
128. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §§1029.5(a) and 1029.6(a).
129. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§1029.5(a) and 1029.6(a).
130. For a discussion of the in forma pauperis power of the courts, see generally
Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 850-53, 523 P.2d 682, 686-89, 114 Cal. Rptr. 642, 646-
49, (1974); County of Sutter v. Super. Ct., 244 Cal. App. 2d 770, 773-75, 53 Cal. Rptr.
424, 426-27 (1966).
131. See, e.g., Nork v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. App. 3d 997, 109 Cal. Rptr. 428 (1973).
132. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §§391-391.6.
133. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §391.1 provides that
[i]n any litigation, at any time within 30 days after service of summons or
other and equivalent process upon him, a defendant may move the court, upon
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process and must be based upon a showing that the plaintiff is a
vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable possibility that the
plaintiff will prevail in the litigation."3 4 At the hearing held upon notice
to the plaintiff, the court must consider all evidence material to the
question of whether the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant within the
meaning of the statute and whether there is any reasonable possibility
that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation.', If the court finds that
the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable
possibility that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits, the court must
order the plaintiff to post security in such form and amount as the court
may fix as sufficient to secure the defendant's reasonable litigation
costs.1 " Such security may be increased or decreased at the court's
discretion upon a showing that it has become inadequate or excessive.
117
Failure to provide the security yields mandatory dismissal of the litiga-
tion as to -the defendant for whose benefit the security was ordered."'
The legislative purpose behind the enactment of the vexatious litigant
statute is probably twofold: (1) to alleviate congestion in the judicial
system caused by vexatious litigation, and (2) to protect the defendant
from the unnecessary expense of defending against multiple litigation
initiated by a vexatious litigant.1"'
In the past decade, California courts have twice rejected constitutional
attacks upon the Vexatious Litigant Statute. 40 The earlier of these
cases, Taliaferro v. Hoogs,141 placed substantial reliance upon Beyer-
bach v. Juno Oil Co., 42 a case rejecting a due process attack against
Corporations Code Section 834. More recently, in Muller v. Tanner,
143
the court reaffirmed both the holding and the rationale of Taliaferro;
notice and hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnish security. The4
motion must be based upon the ground, and supported by a showing, that the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and that there is no reasonable probability that
he will prevail in the litigation against the moving defendant.
CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §391(c) provides that
"[slecurity" means cash, undertaking by a surety, or other security, of such
nature and in such amount as may be fixed by the court, to assure payment,
to the party for whose benefit such security is required to be furnished, of such
party's reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees and not limited to taxable
costs, incurred in or in connection with a litigation instituted, caused to be in-
stituted, or maintained or caused to be maintained by a vexatious litigant.
134. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §391.1.
135. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §391.2.
136. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §391.3.
137. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §391.3.
138. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. §391.4.
139. See Comment, The Vexatious Litigant, 54 CAL L. REv. 1769, 1778 (1966).
140. Muller v. Tanner, 2 Cal. App. 3d 445, 82 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1969); Taliaferro
v. Hoogs, 236 Cal. App. 2d 521, 46 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1965).
141. 236 Cal. App. 2d 521, 46 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1965).
142. 42 Cal. 2d 11, 265 P.2d 1 (1954).
143. 2 Cal. App. 3d 445, 82 Cal. Rptr. 738 (1969).
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however, it remains to be determined whether the statutory procedures
comply with the rapidly emerging standards of procedural due process.
From the statutes already analyzed it should be clear that Code of
Civil Procedure Sections 391 through 391.6 operate to cause a taking of
a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. This is
because the security requirement deprives the plaintiff of the use of the
money or property deposited with the court, or the use of the money
which the plaintiff must pay in order to secure a bond if that is the form
of security required by the court.' 44 Assuming, therefore, that the
elements of state action, a property right and a taking are present, it
remains only to balance the respective interests of the parties to deter-
mine whether the statutory procedures are justifiable in light of current
due process standards. 145 On the one hand is the legislative purpose of
the smooth and efficient operation of the judicial system and the protec-
tion of defendants against multiple suits by vexatious litigants with no
reasonable probability of success, while on the other hand we have an
individual's right to his day in court.'4 Certainly a person is not
deprived of his day in court when he appears before the court for a
determination of the existence of a reasonable possibility that his litiga-
tion will be successful. Nor can it seriously be argued that the statutory
procedures in question are inadequate in light of their purpose. The
statute provides for notice and hearing prior to the taking of any
protected property interest,147 and the hearing specifically addresses
itself to the questions of whether the plaintiff falls within the statutory
definition of a vexatious litigant and whether there exists no reasonable
probability that the plaintiff will recover in the litigation. 148 It is only
where both of these requirements are fulfilled that the court may require
the plaintiff to post security for the defendant's benefit. 49 Thus, inas-
much as the statute provides for notice and hearing as well as an inquiry
into the potential merit of the cause of action, it is submitted that the
requirements of procedural due process are met by the statute.
CONCLUSION
Using an elemental approach to procedural due process, this com-
ment has analyzed several California statutes which impose security for
expense requirements. Drawing on the cases which have interpreted and
144. See text accompanying notes 30-36 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 18-19 supra.
146. See Comment, The Vexatious Litigant, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1778 (1966).
147. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §391.1.
148. CAL. CoDn Civ. PROc. §391.1.
149. CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. §391.3.
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extended the Sniadach rationale, it has been shown that, in all probabili-
ty, at least four of the current California statutes would be held invalid
when properly challenged on the basis of procedural due process, while
the other four statutes could withstand such an attack. With respect to
the statutes found constitutionally deficient, two problems are recurrent:
(1) the statute provides for an ex parte proceeding which cannot be
justified in light of the statutory purpose, and (2) where there is a
hearing, the scope of the hearing is not narrowly tailored to serve the
legislative purpose, i.e. the scope of the inquiry is not limited to those
issues which are material to the furtherance of the legislative purpose
asserted as a justification for the imposition of a security for expense
requirement in the particular case. As has been shown, these statutes
could easily be rehabilitated using Corporations Code Section 834 as a
model. The legislature should take it upon itself to make these changes.
This course of action would render unnecessary further judicial inquiry
into the constitutionality of the remaining security for expense statutes.
Michael A. Marks
